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20130101
20130131
Search Results 0 to 3 of about 4 (some duplicates have been removed)
points out in panama, 1989, iraq, 1990, serbia, 1998, afghanistan, 2001 and iraq, 2003, washington tried sanctions pressure and the threat of force to get leaders to change course, it didn't work. and washington had to make good on its threat to go to war. with north korea, coercive diplomacy also failed, but in this case, washington decided against military action choosing, instead, to contain the regime. making coercive diplomacy requires a mix of threats and promises. with regard to iran, the administration has made the threats plenty of times. with clarity and credibility. but while the sticks have been handled shrewdly, the carrots have not. the united states is unable to define for itself or for the world what would be an acceptable deal and, most importantly, what it is willing to do if ta ron agrees to such a deal? would sanctions be lifted? which ones? would the u.s. stop its efforts to overthrow the regime? would it be willing to discuss normalization of relations with iran? there have been many obstacles in the path of a deal from the iranian side. but a former state departmen
have a stalemate in macedonia over the name issue we have the serbia-kosovo dialogue that's not been pleated, we still have those countries that aspear to ascend ancy into the e.u. i would just urge you that further progress in that area is going to continue to require american leadership. i hope that we will continue to work in the region to ensure that they continue to make progress. >> we will, senator. i just want to thank you for your leadership of the european affairs subcommittee you've done a tremendous job working on it and i look forward to working with you. >> senator kerry, i appreciate your thoughtful opening statement and your thoughtful response to these questions. i have a great deal of respect for your global experience, your depth of knowledge in these areas. i would have enjoyed working with you as a member of the committee and i'm going to enjoy working with you as secretary of state. as you said, these are complex issues and these are dangerous times. i certainly grew up hoping that that maxim of politics ends at the water's edge was actually true. i'm not sure i
of them, libya. because when we bombed serbia, that was four years after -- [inaudible] and then if you look at that lineup, some very nasty questions appear when we talk about -- [inaudible] and there are so many of them that had to write them down. first, what moral duty, what moral duty demands how much sacrifice? second, will i have to commit more bloodshed than the bloodshed i want to prevent? three, do i have the capabilities? that's what we're talking about here. what are my chances of success? , four. five, how sustainable is my mission? how much stamina do i have, and that's very relevant if you look at iraq and afghanistan. six is an end to this intervention. do i have an exit strategy? and seven and finally, what will happen when i leave? will the killing resume? must i come back? now, if you look at it this way and you apply that roster to the five cases, you understand why we intervene in only one case. it was quick, didn't take any sacrifice on our part, we fought from the air. thank god we've got the ammunition from the united states. there was some strategic interest in
Search Results 0 to 3 of about 4 (some duplicates have been removed)